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The Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD)1 is one of the most important trea-
ties in the history of humanity as it deals 
with the infinitely complex but fragile 
diversity of life on earth. Regulating  
access to genetic resources and equitable 
sharing of commercial benefits of bio-
diversity has been the most contentious  
issue in the negotiations under CBD. As 
the impasse continues, the prime objec-
tive of CBD – conservation of biodiver-
sity – is relegated to the backyard. The 
Nagoya Protocol (2010)2 adopted by the 
Tenth Conference of Parties (CoP), con-
cluded on 29 October 2010 in Nagoya, 
Japan, provides the framework to facili-
tate access and benefit-sharing (ABS). 
However, the idea of ABS itself remains 
a pipe dream. 
 A major snag of CBD and the resultant 
national legislations is the shift in focus 
from the ecological and scientific value 
of biodiversity to its mere commercial 
value. This trip has led to the establish-
ment of sovereign rights of nation states 
over their biological resources that was 
historically treated as a common heritage 
of humanity. It was the biodiversity-rich 
developing countries that en masse 
pushed through and succeeded in the  
nationalization of biodiversity as well as 
inclusion of equitable sharing of com-
mercial benefits among the objectives of 
CBD. The developing nations had high 
expectations of CBD under the premise 
that, biological resources being the raw 
material for the biotechnology, seed and 
pharmaceutical industries, are the key to 
potential economic success in the future. 
Biodiversity was portrayed as the green 
gold of the South (biodiversity-rich  
developing countries) that is being sur-
reptitiously pirated by the MNCs of the 
North (developed countries). The politi-
cians and policy makers of the South 
were carried away by the speculations, 
propaganda and lobbying by activists and 
NGOs, rather than empirical evidences. 
Domination of politicians and profes-
sional negotiators on the scientific board 
of CBD also has been hindering effective 
action on the basis of scientific evi-
dence3. 
 Nationalization of genetic resources to 
counter corporate patenting overlooks the 
world’s interdependence on genetic  
resources and the evolutionary history of 
crop plants. Cultivated plants have origi-
nated in different regions of the globe 
and nations of the world are linked in a 
complex network of plant genetic inter-
dependence. No region can afford to iso-
late itself, or be isolated, from access to 
plant germplasm of other regions of  
diversity4,5. This bondage is growing 
ever stronger, due to increasing loss of 
agricultural biodiversity and climate 
change. The International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, albeit legally non-binding, 
reflects appreciation of the world’s inter-
dependence on genetic resources6. 
 The loss of biodiversity from the  
common heritage of humanity would  
adversely affect global food security,  
agricultural production, biodiversity  
research and international relations. All 
these will affect the developing nations, 
more than the developed ones, as the 
former are already plagued by the pro-
blems of population explosion and under-
development. Moreover, sustenance and 
livelihood of small farmers and indi-
genous communities in the South is  
innately linked to biodiversity, both in-
digenous as well as introduced, making 
them more vulnerable to the perils of  
restrictions on access to the global plant 
genetic estate. For example, cassava 
(tapioca) is a major food crop in Africa 
and Asia, where it was introduced from 
South America. It is well known that 
cassava became the sole life savior of the 
marginalized and hungry during major 
famines in Asia and Africa. 
 The Southern venture of nationaliza-
tion and restricted access to biodiversity 
for commercial benefits is unlikely to 
take-off due to innate weaknesses and 
contradictions. Global experience since 
the CBD in 1992 has proved that benefit-
sharing, both as an incentive for conser-
vation as well as royalties for access to 
traditional knowledge, is a proposition 
akin to fetching water in a sieve. Hardly 
any successful model of ABS that is  
a sustainable source of supplementary  
income for the rural communities is 
known. India is one of the richest coun-
tries in terms of biodiversity and the  
associated traditional knowledge. How-
ever, the Indian experience in this regard 
is not promising. India enacted the Bio-
logical Diversity Act in 2002 (refs 7–10), 
mainly to regulate access to biodiversity 
and facilitate benefit-sharing. Despite 
imposing severe restrictions on the  
access to biodiversity in the country,  
India’s gains in sharing commercial 
benefits of biodiversity among its stake-
holders are minimal. The widely publi-
cized case of the ‘Indian Ginseng’, a 
‘wonder drug’ based on the traditional 
knowledge of the Kani tribe in Kerala11,12, 
hailed as the first ever example of benefit-
sharing with an indigenous community, 
has turned out to be a cropper13,14. The 
failure of the Kani-Trichopus ABS 
model, unfurled prior to the introduction 
of the Biological Diversity Act, is attrib-
uted to unrelenting bureaucracy and a 
policy vacuum15. However, the truth is 
that reputed scientists had questioned the 
very scientific basis of the tall claims on 
the medicinal property of Trichopus (see 
Martin15) that went unheard in the din of 
euphoria and publicity. 
 The case of San–Hoodia from South 
Africa is the most unique example in the 
world, where the much touted benefits 
from bioprospecting have had ‘practical 
realization’16. Hoodia gordonii is a suc-
culent plant found in the Kalahari Desert, 
which the San tribes have historically 
consumed to mitigate hunger on long 
journeys. The Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR) of South  
Africa, a public-sector research organiza-
tion, had been granted a patent in 1996 
on an appetite suppressant derived from 
the extract of the plant. The CSIR, 
through its tie-up with the pharmaceuti-
cal companies, Phytopharma and Pfizer, 
and later with the consumer giant, Unile-
ver, attempted further research and 
commercialization of an antiobesity drug 
derived from Hoodia. The South African 
San Council, representing the San peo-
ple, struck a benefit-sharing arrangement 
with CSIR, which specified that the San 
people would receive 6% of the total 
payments to CSIR, including royalties. 
The San trust received 5,69,083 ZAR 
(US$ 75,000) as initial benefit-sharing 
payments. Through licensing the tech-
nology, CSIR was expected to earn US$ 
10 million in milestone payments alone, 
besides ‘substantial’ amounts due to  
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royalties that remain undisclosed. In the 
West, the publicity and hype created by 
the clinical trials of Phytopharma and 
Unilever led to phenomenal escalation in 
the price of the dry product, i.e. up to 
US$ 200 per kilogram, leading to the  
incorporation of the plant into a global 
underground network of diamonds, drugs 
and abalone17. The sudden burst of the 
Hoodia bubble came about in November 
2008, when Unilever announced its deci-
sion to abandon attempts to develop the 
antiobesity product after investing ₤ 20 m 
in Hoodia research over four years17. 
Unilever also disclosed that the clinical 
trials indicated potentially dangerous 
side effects, besides no significant effect 
on calorie consumption18. The cases of 
Kani–Trichopus and San–Hoodia illus-
trate the limitations of commercialization 
of traditional knowledge, which is often 
overvalued and glorified. 
 The National Biodiversity Institute 
(INBio) in Costa Rica, setup in 1989, is a 
pioneer organization that developed the 
concept and practice of bioprospecting 
and benefit-sharing19. INBio’s commer-
cial agreement with the pharmaceutical 
giant Merck, a well-known practical  
example for benefit-sharing, has generated 
substantial direct payments20 and 27 pat-
ents, but no product has reached the 
market and no royalties have been paid 
to the providers of biodiversity21,22. A 
five-year agreement between the South 
African National Biodiversity Institute 
and the Chicago-based Ball Horticulture, 
which is the first North–South biopros-
pecting agreement in the horticulture sec-
tor, led to the development of eight 
commercial varieties. However the royal-
ties, despite being substantial, did not 
surpass the costs of the project16,22.  
Davalos et al.23 recognized the benefits 
obtained from ABS as entirely non-
monetary, as no royalty has resulted from 
any such agreements in Brazil, Colombia 
or the Philippines. It is also known that 
the outcome of benefit-sharing arrange-
ments from mining on aboriginal land in 
Australia has frequently been disappoint-
ing17. 
 The ABS arrangement on the use of 
germplasm of teff (Eragrostis tef ), the 
staple food of Ethiopia and Eritrea,  
between the government agencies of 
Ethiopia and the Netherlands-based com-
pany, Health and Performance Food  
International16, is noteworthy. Birhanu24 
describes the centralization of power in 
the hands of the federal government, 
with little attention to regional and local 
governments as the major feature of the 
agreement. No single community was 
identified in the teff ABS agreement 
even for the purpose of benefit-sharing, 
given the difficulty in identifying a par-
ticular community. Teff being a food 
crop of immense potential for humans, 
restricting access to its genetic resources 
for commercial benefits, on the basis of  
geographical origin and political bounda-
ries, has set an undesirable trend that 
runs on the face of humanity. 
 The National Biodiversity Authority 
(NBA) of India was established accord-
ing to the Biological Diversity Act, 2002, 
to facilitate ABS. One of the first NBA-
facilitated ABS arrangements in India 
was with Pepsico for the cultivation of 
marine alga, Kappaphycus alvarezii25, 
which has already been established as a 
noxious invasive organism that causes 
ecological and economic devastation  
of the marine ecosystems26. This ABS 
agreement raises a few questions: (i) 
How could the communities claim a 
share of the commercial benefits of an 
exotic plant as no traditional knowledge 
is involved in its cultivation or process-
ing? (ii) At the end who will be respon-
sible for the ecological vitiation that it 
creates? According to this agreement, the 
local community will get an initial  
payment of 3.7 million rupees (80,000 
USD). This is a pittance by any national 
or international standards and it is much 
less than any government-sponsored 
community development programme in 
India. Futility of such petty ABS models 
is quickly realized upon comparison with 
the benefits of free exchange of genetic 
materials. For example, rubber, an intro-
duced crop, is the livelihood of more 
than one million small farmers in Kerala27, 
besides being the bedrock of a robust 
rubber industry. This small state has also 
achieved the highest productivity of the 
crop in the world. We wonder whether 
any of the ABS arrangements will ever 
match the benefit the communities – 
poor Kani tribal farmers who make their 
livelihood from less than a dozen rubber 
trees to huge plantations – gain out of 
rubber in Kerala. 
 Koopman28 has comprehensively dealt 
with the problems of proprietary recogni-
tion of traditional knowledge associated 
with biological material. Patents are 
granted for inventions which are suscep-
tible to industrial applications, new and 
involve an inventive step. Traditional 
knowledge is developed in a cultural and 
subsistence milieu, instead of a competi-
tive industrial context and it is often 
communicated and applied openly. Tra-
ditional knowledge on the use of biologi-
cal resources comprises contributions of 
individuals that gradually became com-
munity knowledge with the demise of the 
creators29. How benefit can be given for 
community knowledge which is really 
not different from public knowledge is a 
challenge. Traditional knowledge is con-
fronted with the lack of novelty and/or 
inventivity and is further dampened by 
the need to individualize the invention at 
hand. Proprietary rights on traditional 
knowledge also involve many legal ques-
tions. How should one deal with conflicts 
between multiple communities associ-
ated with the same public knowledge? 
How should one apply requirements such 
as authenticity? How should one ap-
proach parallel sovereignty of countries 
over the same or similar biological mate-
rial? How should the industry verify the 
exclusive competence of the community 
or country it is dealing with and inquire 
the validity of its agreements? Some of 
the above legal questions raised by 
Koopman28 are illustrated by the case of 
Dodonaea viscosa (= D. angustifolia), 
which is a pantropical plant. The farmers 
of Sringeri (Karnataka) and Malayalee 
tribes, an indigenous community of Koli 
Hills (Tamil Nadu), use the plant as bio-
pesticide30. The villagers of Chintamani  
(Karnataka) and Mayan tribes of Santa 
Cruz (Bolivia) use it as a bone setter in 
cattle. The recorded cross-cultural uses of 
this plant in folk medicine vary from that 
in the treatment of itching (Hawaii) and 
burns (Indonesia) to snake bite (India, 
Pakistan), rheumatism (Hawaii, Mexico), 
toothache (Australia, Panama) and bleed-
ing (Colombia)31. Similarly, the same spe-
cies may be used for different purposes 
by different communities and the process 
and method of usage may also vary 
among communities. So it is difficult to 
attribute the right over traditional know-
ledge and share the benefit with any parti-
cular community. It can create conflicts 
between communities and even between 
nations over the resource. 
 If proprietary rights are granted to tradi-
tional knowledge that passes through 
generations, why should patent rights be 
limited to a period of merely 20 years? 
Acceptance of proprietary rights on age-
old traditional knowledge also warrants 
infinite extension of patent protection. 
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Many Southern nations freely deal with 
the manufacture and trade of products 
such as pharmaceuticals after the expiry 
of the patents on them. For example,  
India is yet to invent its first commercial 
antibiotic, but is one of the largest manu-
facturers of antibiotics and other generic 
drugs. Synthetic pesticide industry in  
India is another such example. Similarly, 
India so far has contributed precious little 
in terms of inventions in biotechnology 
and genetic engineering that has made 
any impact in the field. Yet the country 
is self-sufficient in important commercial 
technologies in this area. Many a com-
pany in India is engaged in research and 
development of vaccines and diagnostic 
tools. Public sector in India is capable of 
producing transgenic crops and cloned 
animals. We have just uncouthly adapted 
the ideas and technologies from the North, 
mostly available in the public domain. 
Those who cry hoarse over appropriation 
of age-old traditional knowledge, forget 
about the gains they are making out of 
public knowledge produced by others, 
though legally. 
 Origin and nature of traditional know-
ledge makes it public knowledge. Defen-
sive protection of traditional knowledge 
by documenting and making it available 
in the public domain would prevent mis-
appropriation by elements in the private 
sector that present traditional knowledge 
without further novelty or inventivity as 
inventions for obtaining patents. This 
would also aid in the conservation and 
proper utilization, besides encouraging 
scientific validation and further research 
on traditional knowledge. On the con-
trary, silo-culture of traditional know-
ledge would be counter-productive. 
 Oli29 has stressed that obtaining bene-
fits from traditional knowledge and genetic 
resources is complex and, in practice, it 
is not clear how the local indigenous 
communities will benefit from biopro-
specting. ABS arrangements tend to be 
viable and productive when the contract-
ing parties are technologically advanced 
and higher levels of scientific collabora-
tion are involved, as in the case of Grif-
fith University and Astra Zeneca16. 
Indigenous communities are marginally 
benefited when the ABS deal involves 
collection and/or processing of high-
value raw material in bulk quantities for 
the industry, as exemplified by the trade 
of Australian sandalwood16. But such 
cases are more or less akin to the normal 
trade in raw materials and the commer-
cial benefits accrued are neither by virtue 
of the associated traditional knowledge 
nor due to royalties flowing out of any 
patented product developed from the bio-
logical material. Without adequate infra-
structure and higher levels of scientific 
collaboration, ABS would only relegate 
the local communities to the status of 
‘fodder collectors’ for the industry. 
 Evidently, ABS professed as a solution 
to the problems of development of the 
South is untenable. Emotion and nationa-
listic sentiments further obfuscate the 
ABS illusion for reality, thus pushing 
aside a rational solution. The resolution 
adopted by FAO in November 2009 calls 
upon the CoP of CBD to take into  
account the special nature of the genetic 
resources for food and agriculture, as all 
countries depend on genetic resources 
originating elsewhere to address envi-
ronmental, natural resource, sustainable 
development, food security and climate 
challenges32. It is high time the South re-
alizes that the commercial benefits which 
can be derived through sharing of bio-
diversity and the associated traditional 
knowledge are insignificant and irrele-
vant in the face of vital issues such as 
food security. Benefit-sharing, the wrong 
shortcut to economic development, can 
neither be a substitute for innovation, in-
vention or industrialization, nor a sus-
tainable source of income for the rural 
communities. Underdevelopment of the 
South needs to be addressed in a much 
broader socio-economic and political 
context. The genetic resources of the 
global plant genetic estate were tradi-
tionally available free to the industries of 
the North, whereas products derived from 
the genetic resources were subjected to 
intellectual property protection. It was 
this asymmetry in ownership of techno-
logy and commercial gains through the 
intellectual property regime that widened 
the chasm between the South and the 
North, ultimately leading to the nation-
alization of genetic resources for benefit-
sharing. But as pointed out earlier, the 
means adopted by the South to address 
its grievances has now been proved to be 
wrong and counter-productive. A plausi-
ble way to address the issue would have 
been attempts to change the intellectual 
property rights (IPR) regime, rather than 
restricting access to biodiversity through 
locking up in the national silos. Possibi-
lity of an IPR regime that positively  
discriminates the South, in addition to 
North–South collaborations in research, 
development and commercialization of 
biodiversity is worth pondering. How-
ever, the South at present is left with few 
options as the present global economic 
scenario warrants intellectual property 
protection to attract investments in  
research and innovation. The developing 
world, in its own interest, should forgo 
benefit-sharing to facilitate free exchange 
of genetic resources as the benefits of the 
latter far outweigh those of benefit-
sharing. 
 It is doubtful whether CBD will ever 
progress towards its goal of halting all 
extinctions by 2050, unless the funda-
mental flaw of nationalization of biodi-
versity and the misplaced thrust on 
commercial benefits is corrected. Bio-
diversity is on the brink and the rate of  
extinction continues to be lethal33,34.  
Nations of the world should come  
together for the conservation of biodiver-
sity as time is running out fast. In the 
changing global scenario, India has a 
greater responsibility to assume the lead 
role, especially as the next CoP is to take 
place in New Delhi in 2012. 
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